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Employee Stock Ownership Plans:
New Players in the Leveraged
Buyout Game
by Jon Shepherd
Hostile takeover. Leveraged buyout. Almost every company chief
executive hates to hear those two terms and tries to guard against his
or her company becoming the object of an unwanted suitor. Lately,
some major companies have been taking steps to protect themselves
against possible buyout offers, and one of the most popular defense
maneuvers has been to institute employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs). Why did companies originally begin using ESOPs? Will
employee stock ownership plans actually protect companies from
hostile takeovers? Will ESOPs be used in friendly leveraged buyouts,
or will ESOPS be used in hostile takeovers to gain control over the very
companies they were originally designed to protect?

Advantages of Employee Stock Ownership Plans
American companies originally began using employee stock
ownership plans in order to help motivate their employees. ESOPs
improve employees' retirement security by providing stock that
employees can purchase while working for the company and sell after
retiring. ESOPs also usually make employees more productive and
efficient (Hammonds 1989, p. 39). Workers, realizing they will now
benefit from increased profits, will tend to work harder at their own
jobs and make sure other workers are properly doing theirs. Surveys
by the U.S. General Accounting Office and the National Center for
Employee Ownership have shown that companies which use ESOPs
that involve employee-owners in sharing information and participating in decision-making are more profitable and more efficient than
those ESOP companies which do not (Taplin 1988, p. 46). A survey of
400 companies by the ESOP Association found that 71 percent of the
respondents believed their ESOP improved productivity (Taplin 1988,
p. 85).
The same survey also showed that over one-half of the 400 companies started their ESOPs since 1984 (Taplin 1988, p. 85). In 1989 alone,
70 publicly traded companies established employee stock ownership
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plans (Parham 1989, p. 10). Loans to ESOPs skyrocketed from $6.5
billion in] 988 to $18 billion in the first half of 1989 (Pa rham 1989, p. 10).
This huge increase in the use of ESOPs is surely attributable to more
than companies merely trying to boost productivity. Employee stock
ownership pl ans also strengthen companies aga inst hostile takeovers.
This occurs because, in most tend er offers, employees vote th eir ESOP
shares in fa vor of existing managemen t in order to save their jobs. Even
the simple presence of an ESOP may be enough to scare off possible
buyers. 'The best known exampl e of an employee stock ownership plan
blocking a takeover was Shamrock Holdin gs' attempted takeover of
Polaroid, which ended early in 1989. Polaroid permitted its ESOP to
enlarge its holdings to 14 percent of th e company's outstanding shares
in order to sta ve off Shamrock's bid . Not giving up , Shamrock sued
Polaroid in the Delaware court sys tem to block thi s action. The
Delaware Chancery Cour t judge turned down Shamrock's challenge,
ruling tha t Polaroid 's ESOP was completely legal as it was in its
planning stages or already partially in place before the hostile bid . The
judge also noted tha t Polaroid's employees could vote their shares in
confidence during a tender offer (Hammonds 1989, p . 39). As Ma lon
Wilkus, president of an investment banking firm which specializes in
leveraged ESOPs, has said, this court d ecision " has gone much further
than Congress ever would to solve the problem of hostile takeovers" in
the U.S. (Hammonds 1989, p. 39).
Polaroid's court victory has inspired many other companies to
adopt ESOPs as a takeover defense. The Tribune Company and
Lockheed Corporation recently instituted ESOPs to discourage potential purchasers; J.C. Penney borrowed $700 million to buy stock
through its ESOP as a defense against a rumored raider; and Proctor
and Gamble's ESOP borrowed over one billion dollars, with the
company guaranteeing the d ebt, to purchase enough stock to push its
stake to over 20 percent of all outstanding shares (Personnel Administrator 1989, p.16). Polaroid's employees recently voted to take pay cuts
to enlarge their ESOP's holding beyond 14 percent (Hammonds 1989,
p. 39). These are just a few of the many companies which began or
enlarged their ESOPs after the Polaroid ruling was handed down.
Obviously, ESOPs provide some protection from hostile takeovers for
those companies that form them.

Leveraged versus Unleveraged ESOPs
When instituting an employee stock ownership plan, a company
must decide what benefits it wishes to obtain from the plan. If
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protection from a takeover threat is desired, a leveraged ESOP is the
correct choice. Tocreatea leveraged ESOP, a company first establishes
a trust through which it borrows enough money to purchase the
amount of stock needed to reach the ESOP's planned size. Stock is then
generally distributed to employees as the loan is paid off, with the
plan's trustees usually keeping control of the stock before it is distributed (James 1989, p. 55). By assuming a large debt load, the company
insulates itself from a takeover because corporate raiders are usually
unwilling to attempt to takeover a company with a large debt.
Unleveraged ESOPs arc usually established to improve the productivity of employees and/ or their retirement security. Under these
plans, the trustees purchase shares over time, which means the employer's contributions of funds for the purchase of stock can be very
flexible (James 1989, p . 55). This allows the company to decrease its
expenses and contributions in a poor fiscal year and increase them in
periods of greater profitability. Because of this flexibility, unleveraged
stock ownership plans arc the correct choice for companies that have
no reason, such as a takeover threat, to purchase a large block of stock
at one time.
Employees almost always benefit when a leveraged ESOP is established to prevent a takeover attempt because they retain their jobs
while also becoming stockholders. However, leveraged ESOPs almost
always hurt existing stockholders because not only are they denied
the premium which the raider offers for their shares, but downwa rd
pressure is exerted on the value of those shares as the company takes
on debt to purchase existing stock or issues new stock. Unleveraged
ESOPs, on the other hand, usually impose the burden of payment on
the group receiving the benefits of the plan--the employees. Because a
large block of stock does not have to be purchased at one time, the
company can negotiate with employees to trade wage increases or
other benefits for the establishment of an employee stock ownership
plan and employer contributions to it.

The Friendly ESOP Buyout
Employee stock ownership plans, created to boost productivity
and protect the company from hostile takeovers, are themselves recently being used in more active roles in acquiring companies through
leveraged buyouts (LBOs). One of the main reasons for this is the 1984
tax reform law. This law provided opportunities for banks and
insurance companies that lend to ESOPs to exclude 50 percent of the
resulting interest income from their taxable income (Berss 1989, p. 41).

Drajiings in Economics

As a result, they usually offer lower interest rates and payments for an
ESOP which borrows to buy company stock than for other borrowers.
Secondly, once it purchases the company, the ESOP is allowed to pay
the principle and the interest on the debt with pretax dollars (Berss
1989, p. 41). This serves to reduce greatly the company' s tax bill and
raises its profits. Some congressional leaders, however, arc currently
trying to eliminate one of these tax breaks. In June 1989, bills were
introduced in the Senate and House to eliminate the tax breaks available to banks that loan to ESOPs (James 1989, p . 55 ). This would
decrease the amount of loanable funds available to ESOPS and would
also serve to raise the real cost of loans: the interest rate. Both bills arc
currently awaiting committee action (Congressional Index 1989, pp.
28,304, 51,103).
There have been several recent examples of leveraged buyouts
involving employee stock ownership plans. In 1987 alone, ten leveraged buyouts worth more than $60 million apiece involved ESOPs as
the major, if not the only, owner (Employee Benefit Plan Review, July
1989, p. 22). The two largest LBOs involving ESOPs were A vis, whose
plan was formed after the company had experienced its sixth owner in
five years, and HealthTrust, which became the largest ESOP majority
owned company. Health Trust's recent history offers a vivid example
of the opportunities that may be made available to a company after an
ESOP-led acquisition. During the first year of the new ownership the
firm experienced savings of over$11 million on supply costs and, at the
end of the year, net revenues had increased 8.3 percent (Employee
Benefit Plan Review, June 1989, p. 35).
Weirton Steel provides a more sobering example of what can
happen when an ESOP decides to buy its own company. In 1984,
Weirton's parent corporation, National Steel , threatened to close the
factory because of losses. Weirton's employees opted to take pay cuts
in order to buy the plant and keep it open. Since 1984 the company has
been consistently profitable (Berss 1989, p . 42). However, the situation
at Weirton has not been as bright as it first seemed. Weirton's ESOP,
like most LBO firms, hired outside managers to run the company, and
there have been many conflicts between the employee-owners and
their management team. The original ESOP agreement said the company must, in 1990, repurchase all shares held by employees wishing to
sell (Schroeder 1989, p. 66). Weirton's managers, having a limited free
cash flow, wished to sell 20 percent of the repurchased shares in a
public offering. Not only would this plan save management money,
but it would also give it part of the money needed for plant modernization. The other portion of the needed modernization funds would be
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realized from a cut in the amount of profits paid to employees from the
current level of 50 percent to only 33 percent (Schroeder 1989, p. 66).
Weirton's workers are fighting these moves. They feel that since
they were the ones who originally saved the company, they should
now reap the benefits of profitability. Also, the employees are fearful
of a corporate raider gaining control over a large block of stock and
decreasing the degree of worker control over the company (Schroeder
1989, p. 67). This entanglement gives credence to what many critics of
ESOPs claim: that employee control, especially when a union is involved, inevitably conflicts with the need for strong management to
have free reign to make decisions (Schroeder 1989, p. 66).

Unions and ESOPs
Many union leaders do not want to see an ESOP in which their
members are shareholders used to purchase a company. Even though
the AFL-CIO estimates over 100,000 jobs have been lost in the past five
years due to takeovers, many labor union leaders are still not willing to
capitalize on the opportunities to increase job security available to
them through the encouragement of ESOP-led takeovers (Berss, April
1989, p. 41). More than one-half of the 1.1 million members of the
United Food and Commercial Workers Union have seen their employers acquired or merged out of existence, yet their president, Bill 01 well,
contends: "I don't necessarily believe we have the capability to run a
company" (Berss 1989, p. 41). However, almost all LBO groups hire
outside management to run the companies they purchase. Union
leaders do not have to know how to run the company in order to
participate in an employee-led buyout.
Another reason why unions do not want to encourage ESOPs to
participate in leveraged buyouts is put forth by Malon Wilkus, a
financial advisor to unions: "Unions are reluctant to do buyouts
because they see ESOPs as a tool for union busting" (Berss 1989, p. 41 ).
This is based on the belief that the main purpose of unions is to bargain
with the owners for their members. If the employees are the owners,
there ceases to be a need for the union, and union leaders find
themselves without jobs. Another reason why unions seem to be
reluctant to support ESOP-initiated leveraged buyouts is that it requires a radical reversal in the way union leaders think. Unions have
almost always prospered on an us-versus-them psychology, but ESOPs
turn employees from "us" into "them" (Berss 1989, p. 42). Because of
this new "worker capitalism," the adversarial tactics employed by
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unions in the past arc now becoming obsolete, but union leaders seem
to be unable or unwilling to change their way of thinking.
Even when some local union members support an ESOP in its
a ttempt to purchase a company, friction within the union often occurs
because national union leaders may wish to avoid participating in
worker-led buyouts. In 1988, a hostile takeover of the Stop & Shop
retail grocery chain was attempted by the Dart Group. The workers of
Stop & Shop, represented by Food Workers Local 1351, attempted to
assume theroleof white knight and purcha se the company. This action
almost worked until the national union leaders decided to block the
transaction. Stop & Shop was later acquired by Kohlberg, Kravis and
Roberts (Berss 1989, p. 41). This seems to be an example of national
union leaders being unresponsive to th e needs of their members.
Wh ether this occurred simply because the national leaders were afraid
of losing their jobs or because they were unable to change their way of
thinking is impossible to tell. However, if national union leaders
become unresponsive to theneedsof their locals, members of the locals
may replace them with leaders who might be more responsive to the
ESOP options available to them.
According to Berss, one major factor that could cause unions to
become more involved in the leveraged buyout game is that some
major investment banking firms have a large incentive to get unions
involved {Berss 1989, p . 41). This incentive is the huge fee the investment banking firms make from setting up the leveraged buyout plan
and from securing the financing actually needed to take a company
over. Because of this and the tax breaks to be gained, any ESOP which
decides to undertake a leveraged buyout will probably have ready
access to the finances and financial advice needed to succeed. This,
taken by itself, may be enough to tempt any ESOP into a takeover of its
parent company.

Hostile ESOP Buyouts
The previously described involvements in leveraged buyouts by
employee stock ownership plans occurred with the blessing of their
companies' managements. However, the first hostile leveraged buyout
by an ESOP could be on the horizon. Modine Manufacturing, a major
maker of vehicular heat-transfer products, could have the distinction
of being the first company taken private by a hostile ESOP-led buyout
(Marcial 1989, p . 34). The company's workers are upset with management because it is not doing enough to raise the company's stock price.
The company's ESOP, the biggest shareholder, filed a 130 in August
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1988, reporting a stake of over 17 percent. A 13D is a document an
investor is required to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission whenever a 13 percent or larger stake is acquired in a company.
Some experts believe that the ESOP is likely to team up with an outside
investor group to take the company private (Marcial 1989, p. 34).
Although this has not yet happened, the threat still exists and could be
exercised by the ESOP at any time.
Why would Modine' s employee stock ownership plan consider an
LBO? Under what conditions might another ESOP undertake a leveraged buyout? To make any leveraged buyout attractive, a company's
stock must be relatively undervalued. In Modine's case, the stock was
selling at around $12, but it had a book value of $14 and a breakup value
of over $26 (Marcial 1989, p. 34). Secondly, the stock should be selling
at a big discount relative to its competitors' shares. The price/ earnings
ratio of Modine's stock at that time was only 8.3, but its competitors'
P /E ratios ranged from 12 to 15 (Marcial 1989, p. 34). Third, like any
other major investor in a company, the ESOP's members must be kept
happy by the company's management. If management repeatedly
ignores the desires of any major investor, including the ESOP, the
company may become a takeover candidate.
Another factor increases the possibility of an ESOP-led hostile
takeover in the near future. The Internal Revenue Service has recently
stated it will now allow investment bankers to sell bonds publicly to
finance ESOP stock purchases (Parham 1989, p. 10). Prior to this,
employee stock ownership plans, and companies establishing them,
could only borrow from private lenders such as banks, insurance firms,
and mutual funds. The recent IRS action greatly expands the amount
of loanable funds available to ESOPs by allowing them to borrow from
many more sources than before. With all the tools now available to
employee stock ownership plans, ESOP-led hostile takeovers appear
imminent.

Conclusion
By the end of 1989, there were over 10,000 employee stock ownership plans in operation, covering almost 10 million employees (James
1989, p. 53). Of the $311 billion in leveraged buyouts in 1989, however,
fewer than two percent involved ESOPs (Berss 1989, p. 41). Employee
stock ownership plans were originally established because employers
believed them to increase the productivity of their workers and because they improved worker retirement security. Companies also
began using employee stock ownership plans to protect themselves
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from corporate raiders. ESOPs then beca me active players in the
leveraged buyout gam.e by participating in fri endl y leveraged takeovers. However,employeestockownershipplansha ve notyetreached
their full potential in the leveraged buyout arena. If the governmen t
refrains from intervening, employee stock ownership plans can, and
will,eventually be a major factor in hostil e leveraged buyouts--the very
thing they were d esigned to protect a company from in the first place.
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